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Abstract 
The protection of patient information is now more important as a national e-health system approaches reality in 
Australia. The major challenge for health care providers is to understand the importance information security 
whilst also incorporating effective protection into established workflow and daily activity. Why then, when it is 
difficult for IT and security professionals to navigate through and apply the myriad of information security 
standards, do we expect small enterprises such as primary health care providers to also be able to do this. This is 
an onerous and impractical task without significant assistance. In the development of the new Computer and 
Information Security Standards (CISS) for Australian General Practice, a consistent and iterative process for the 
interpretation and application of international standards was used. This involved both the interpretation of the 
standards and the application of knowledge to create a practical but acceptable level of security for the primary 
healthcare environment. From a security perspective such practical application of standards poses the 
dichotomous challenge (and criticism) of how much security is sufficient versus how much can the primary 
healthcare environment manage. This paper describes the path of development from standards to implementation 
using the CISS as an example. It is concluded that more practical assistance is required by the security profession 
to support the national e-health initiative if Australia is to provide a safe and secure healthcare environment. 
Keywords 
Information security, standards, medical, healthcare security. 
INTRODUCTION 
A national e-health system for Australia is rapidly becoming a reality. The political drive for a Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health record (PCEHR) has seen the rapid progression of the underlying e-health 
infrastructure. The PCEHR will provide a “secure, electronic record of your medical history, stored and shared 
in a network of connected systems. The PCEHR will bring key health information from a number of different 
systems together and present it in a single view” (NEHTA, 2011). This is not designed to replace the complete 
patient record held at the local medical practitioner but to provide a collated view of the patient health summary 
that will be able to be shared with other health providers. As such, the PCEHR is not of itself the basis for the e-
health system; it is only one part of it.  Thus the protection of patient information is now more important as a 
national e-health system approaches reality in Australia. The major challenge for health care providers is to 
understand the importance information security whilst also incorporating effective protection into established 
workflow and daily activity.  
The development of a coherent and interoperable e-health system in Australia is made more complicated by the 
division of control between the federal (national) and state governments for public healthcare services as well as 
the strong private healthcare sector in the primarily private primary care sector, and some allied and hospital 
services. Therefore, information security protection for smaller healthcare providers, such as those in general 
practice, is particularly important and the focus of this paper.  At the heart of creating an infrastructure that 
supports information sharing are standards to ensure interoperability and consistent information management. 
Information security is an integral part of this architecture. Since information security is an established and well 
developed discipline, the existing mature practices are a key component of this architecture. Why then, when it is 
difficult for IT and security professionals to navigate through and apply the myriad of information security 
standards, do we expect small enterprises such as primary health care providers to also be able to do this.  
Standards, policies and recognized practice do not need to be redeveloped for the healthcare environment. 
However, there is no doubt that they do need to be contextualised and modelled to fit into a well established 
health framework, rather than attempting to cascade over and impose a regime of security (as is the case in the 
corporate environment) that so obviously does not fit well into the healthcare setting .    This paper discusses the 
standards that are relevant to the primary healthcare setting and provide a case study of how these can be 
interpreted and applied. This development has been an integral part of the development of the new Royal 
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Australian College of General Practitioners, Computer and Information Security Standards, and the paper gives 
this as an example of what work is needed in this area.  
SECURITY STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE 
Established and accepted information security management planning includes, risk assessment, contingency 
planning (business impact analysis, incident response, disaster recovery and business continuity) and protection 
controls and monitoring (Whilman & Mattord, 2008). In the security community it is widely accepted that 
standards must drive policy which then informs decision making and good security practice.  
The application of standards is not an insignificant task. “One of the great challenges facing IT professionals is 
how to navigate through the sea of regulatory compliances, industry standards, and numerous security and IT 
operational best practice standards and frameworks” (Tordoff, 2008). Further, complexity is apparent in that 
standards tend to focus on process rather than application and implementation. Indeed, it is not surprising that 
standards must be contextualised to synergise with an organisation’s culture, support its mission and fit into 
established work processes (Hone & Eloff, 2002).  
All organizations have multiple legislative regulations to comply with, and healthcare has the added professional 
and ethical requirements inherent to the environment. What is required for demonstrable defensible practice are 
cohesive and realistically implementable information security plans that can be assessed and measured for 
protection compliance, and can be used as a guide for improvement. It must be accepted that information 
security is always going to be a ‘work in progress’ and that 100% security is rarely, if ever, achievable; indeed, 
some would argue that it is impossible to achieve.  For instance, hacking is a sophisticated attack mechanism and 
therefore unpredictable and difficult to prevent. In the USA, breach notification legalisation in enacted which 
provides some measure of the enormity of the problems now being encountered in regards to breaches from 
malicious and human error (Hancock, 2005).    
The problems with security standards application 
The major challenge for health care providers is to understand the importance of information security whilst also 
incorporating effective protection into established workflow and daily activity. This is an onerous and 
impractical task without significant assistance. This challenge does not only reside with the healthcare profession 
and those in the context to which the standards are applied, but also for the security profession and the standards 
community who advise and set the standards. They also need to understand a broader perspective on the realistic 
application of these standards. Indeed, even the standards community recognize that applying standards needs 
contextualization, as is evidenced by the development of ISO27799 from ISO27002. Table 1 shows the 
standards that are directly relevant to the development of practical information security guidance in the primary 
healthcare setting.   
Standards exist to ensure a secure system and provide associated minimum technical specifications. It is 
therefore necessary to translate a standard into policy and then procedures specific to the environment of use. 
Yet, this has been problematic in the healthcare environment. Policy derived from standards must be singular 
and continually monitored if it is to be effective (Owens et al, 2001). The real and perceived cost overhead, 
which whilst reducing risk and contributing to information protection does not overtly contribute to patient care 
simply adds to the misunderstanding of the importance of security at the management level.  To date whilst 
quoting risk assessment as an integral part of security, it is an task that is not really assessed, whether from being 
too difficult or time consuming to be undertaken, and its omission limits both the understanding of the issues and 
the importance of what realistically needs protection. Whilst the Australian HB 174-2003 handbook features best 
practice control measures for information security and is designed for a non-technical readership, it does not 
alone assist in implementation application. Similar to other guidelines, it does not cater for specific types of 
health providers or organisations and therefore contains a more complicated picture for those with minimal 
security knowledge. 
The issue with using un-interpreted standards is the level of knowledge and expertise that is required to apply 
and implement them, the resourcing that is often associated with this in terms of time, and the impetus to 
undertake the task. In the healthcare environment this issue has been evident from research and experience in the 
field (Williams, 2008). The autonomous nature of staff in healthcare and specifically in smaller healthcare 
organisations reinforces informal and individualised work practices. This can be a barrier where a lack of fit 
between policy and work practice occurs (Adams and Blandford, 2005). Part of the problem is to create a culture 
around the integration and recognition of security in the work place. This however will always be a challenge in 
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an environment that is not corporately based and where security is not considered integral to core business. 
However, where treating patients and healthcare are the main focus, the correct and protective management of 
healthcare information is essential, particularly as the connectedness of the e-health environment is gradually put 
in place. The following section outlines how development of a minimised and simplified process using the 
relevant standards in Table 1 has been achieved with the 2011 Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
(RACGP) Computer and Information Security Standards (RACGP, 2011).  
 
Standard Description Relevance to the application to 
general practice 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 - Information 
technology -- Security techniques -- 
Information security management 
systems -- Requirements. 
General business implementation 
not tailored for healthcare. Part of 
the ISO 27000 group of standards 
for Information Security 
Management Systems 
Incorporates basic processes for 
risk assessment and identification of 
overarching principles. 
ISO 27002 (previously ISO 
17799:2005) Information 
technology - Security techniques - 
Code of practice for information 
security management 
Developed from ISO/IEC 
17799:2000. It provides best 
practice guidelines for Information 
Security Management Systems 
implementation.  
Provides detailed areas of security 
with background explanation of 
importance. It also provides some 
(but not all) indication of technical 
and social measures required in 
general principle form.   
ISO 27799-(Health informatics - 
information security management in 
health using ISO/IEC 27002 
Applied the context for using ISO 
27002 to healthcare setting in 
general and incorporates aspects of 
interoperability considerations.  
Whilst incorporates controls these 
are not prioritized. They were 
referred to complete parts of the 
matrix for risk assessment and 
controls once the categorization and 
prioritization of risks were 
established.  
HB 174-2003- Information security 
management - Implementation guide 
for the health sector 
This handbook was derived from 
NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 and 
details the controls specifically for 
the health sector in Australia.  
This provided grounding in the 
application for the Australian 
scenario. Whilst aimed at small to 
medium enterprises it still does not 
embrace the difficulties faced by 
primary care practices in lack of IT 
and security expertise, It is also now 
out of date in some areas.  
ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – 
principles and guidelines. 
Provides generic guidance on risk 
principles. 
Used to ensure comprehensive 
coverage of risk issues.  
HB 231 - 2004 Information security 
risk management guidelines. 
Generic guidance on 
implementation of a risk 
management process.  
Used in conjunction with ISO31000 
to provide the practical aspects and 
determine to what extent these 
applied to the primary care 
environment.  
HB 292 - 2006 A practitioners guide 
to business continuity management; 
and HB 293 - 2006 Executive guide 
to business continuity management. 
Provides generic but accepted and 
integrated approach to business 
continuity in the business and 
corporate environments.  
Used specifically to inform the 
development of the business 
continuity section.  
Guidelines contributing to the Australian primary care information protection principles  
 Information Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act 1988  
 NIST (2008). Computer security incident handling guide. Special Publication 800-61. National Institute 
of Standards and Technology.  
 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. (2006).  National Privacy Principles  
 
Table 1. Standards relevant to development of practical guidance to primary care in information security.  
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CASE STUDY IN APPLICATION TO HEALTHCARE 
In the development of the new Computer and Information Security Standards for Australian General Practice, a 
systematic process for the analysis and application of international standards was used. This involved both the 
interpretation of the standards and the application of knowledge to create a practical but acceptable level of 
security for the primary healthcare environment. The process was systematic as each standard was reviewed in 
order and used to inform the development of the major risk-control matrix shown in Table 2.   
As in many specific areas of healthcare and business for small organisations, it is the time and expertise factors 
that interfere with the development of good practice in security. With this in mind, it was necessary to use the 
authors’ experience and knowledge of both the security and healthcare areas to formulate a simplified but 
effective process for ensuring good security practice and protection in general practices. For this objective the 
standards in Table 1 were systematically reviewed and used to guide this development, whilst consistently 
applying the knowledge of what was possible and practical for practices to undertake themselves. Table 2 
indicates the synthesis of this into a simplified form. Table 2 is an extract only of the full table in the published 
RACGP Computer and Information Security Standards Workbook (RACGP, 2011), and in the published version 
each dot point is also cross-referenced to the RACGP Standard for further explanation. 
It should be noted that this is not the whole process and other aspects integral to the management of the 
information security process were also included, such as establishing responsibilities, contact points, asset 
identification etc, However, these are not provided here for the purpose of this case study. What was required 
was to identify the common threats to the primary care environment and provide associated mitigations without 
making the requirements is large a task that it would not be undertaken at all and therefore not useful. The 
selection of threats also included link to the privacy principles as well as the ethical and professional aspects of 
clinical practice and the protection of patient information.  
 
Risk Assessment – Threat, vulnerability and controls 
Threat /  
Risk Source 
Disruption / 
Impact 
Vulnerability Suggested Appropriate 
Controls 
Controls Person 
Responsible 
Existing Required 
(to action) 
Human – Unintentional- – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties)                           
Error / omissions 
e.g. deletion of 
files, failure to 
check backup 
- Financial 
loss 
- Disrupt 
operational 
activities 
-Breach of 
integrity 
(inadvertent 
information 
modification 
or destruction) 
- Legitimate 
access to 
systems  
- Lack of 
training 
Staff training in policy and 
procedures 
Backup and recovery 
procedures in place 
<practice 
to 
complete> 
<practice 
to 
complete> 
<practice to 
complete> 
Inadvertent access 
by staff 
- Violation of 
legislation or 
regulation 
- Breach of 
confidentiality 
(potential  
information 
disclosure) 
- Legitimate 
access to 
systems by 
staff 
- Lack of 
formal 
implemented 
policy and 
procedures, 
particularly 
password 
controls 
 
Implemented and 
monitored access control 
policy and procedure 
Breach reporting in place 
Confidentiality and non-
disclosure agreements 
signed  
Agreements with third 
parties signed 
Password protected screen 
savers  
Limit access to system 
utilities 
   
Inadvertent viewing 
of information by 
non-staff 
- Violation of 
legislation or 
regulation 
- Breach of 
confidentiality 
- Lack of 
appropriate 
access control 
- Staff not 
following 
policy 
Staff training in policy and 
procedures 
Clear desk and clear screen 
policy 
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Risk Assessment – Threat, vulnerability and controls 
Threat /  
Risk Source 
Disruption / 
Impact 
Vulnerability Suggested Appropriate 
Controls 
Controls Person 
Responsible 
Existing Required 
(to action) 
Technical – Deliberate 
Malicious code 
(e.g. virus) 
- Disrupt 
operational 
activities 
- Denial or 
degradation of 
service 
- Data loss 
- Breach of 
integrity 
 
- Inadequate 
network and 
internet 
protection 
- Lack of staff 
training 
-Not keeping 
anti-virus 
updates current 
- Spam 
filtering 
Anti-malware software 
automatically regularly 
updated  
Regular precautionary scans 
of information systems  
Spam filtering  
Staff education on email 
attachments  
Prohibit use of unauthorised 
software 
Block use of mobile code 
e.g. use web browser 
security to limit program 
add-ons (unknown 
ActiveX)  
Limit use of file 
transfer/peer-to-peer 
applications unless essential 
to normal operations  
Control or prohibit use of 
external and personal 
devices such as USB   
   
Information loss - Violation of 
legislation or 
regulation 
- Adversely 
affect 
reputation 
- Breach of 
confidentiality 
- Poor or no 
backup 
procedures 
- Lack of 
appropriate 
access control 
Effective, monitored 
backup procedures  
Breach reporting to 
authorities 
Segregation of system 
utilities from application 
software (seek advice from 
technical service provider). 
Limit access to system 
utilities  
   
Denial of Service 
(DoS - attempt to 
make computer 
resources 
unavailable) 
- Loss or 
degradation of 
network 
capacity 
- Loss of 
Internet 
connectivity 
 
Configure Intrusion 
detection system to detect 
DoS 
Firewall configuration to 
block specified network 
traffic 
Block outgoing connections 
to Internet relay chat (IRC), 
instant messaging and peer-
to-peer services(seek advice 
from technical service 
provider) 
   
Table 2. Threats, vulnerabilities and controls for general practice security (RACGP, 2011, extract of Table 22) 
 
Whilst only an abstract of the matrix is given in Table 2, the full matrix includes the six categories of  
 Human – Unintentional- – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties)    
 Human – Deliberate – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties) 
 Human – Deliberate – External 
 Technical – Unintentional 
 Technical – Deliberate 
 Environmental 
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It is clear that most explicit environments and domains have specific security threats and vulnerabilities, and as 
such the majority of the risk and control matrix can be completed by those knowledgeable of security and the 
specific domain to which it is being applied. Therefore the whole process of implementing security can be made 
more straightforward. Subsequently, a medical practice can record the existing measures they already have in 
place and identify easily those that need to be considered. This can be done to a greater extent without the 
assistance of external support providers in the first instance, although the matrix does identify when this 
assistance may be required.  
In a similar development manner, the business continuity section of the workbook (deemed to be an area of 
major concern to the profession and poorly executed in many general practices) was also developed to assist 
practices in indentifying their critical functions, manual or replacement procedures in the event of the system 
failure, and corrective actions using simple tables to both create and define logical procedures.  The standards 
and workbook were reviewed and validated by other experts in the security and healthcare field, the RACGP e-
health unit, general practitioners, practice managers, as well as the National Standing Committee for E-Health.  
CONCLUSION 
From a security perspective, the practical application of standards poses the dichotomous challenge (and 
criticism) of how much security is sufficient versus how much can the primary healthcare environment manage. 
The recent development of the RACGP Computer and Information Security Standards and Workbook has taken 
six months of interpretation and application of the standards. They demonstrate that practical assistance can be 
developed in such as way to assist primary care practices to put in place sufficient and effective security 
measures. This standard will now be incorporated into the RACGP national accreditation of general practice and 
will provide evidence of a basic level of security practice by healthcare providers. For medical practices it will 
also offer a method for demonstrable practice and guidance in improvement in practice as some aspects are 
aspirational. To the healthcare profession it indicates the importance of information security in understandable 
terms, and provides a basis for the extension of security measures that will be necessary for connection to the 
national e-health system which (driven by the political landscape) will begin in earnest in July 2012. It is 
intended that this RACGP standard will be extended to incorporate all office based medical practices in 2012.  
The security profession must work together with the healthcare profession to provide both technical expertise 
and increased social awareness of the importance of information security. Whilst this may not be a necessity 
peculiar to the healthcare domain, it is proving a challenge in the current progressive e-health environment. It is 
highly likely that the perception of information security and its importance will develop as the e-health 
information sharing situation evolves in Australia over the next few years. Whilst some of this may be driven by 
legislation and the altered information sharing environment shifts, this perception will not occur automatically. 
Ultimately, it will require a change of healthcare organisational culture to reframe the importance and 
significance of information security to the e-health environment.  
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